Sorry dude, 5% just ain’t enough of a market to care about, when you can make so much more catering to the other 95%… Unless it’s your specialty to cater to the 5%, but are YOU PERSONALLY willing to pay a few thousand bucks for a little widget that you don’t really need that everyone else gets for a few dollars or free? Yeah, that’s how big the cost difference is for real security, that’s the problem! But I do think there are improvements that can be made, just they’re going to be a lot smaller than we wish… at least for quite a while from what I’ve seen so far. – we really need to stop our governments interfering with security standards and practices, trying to make everything weaker! – can there be new design methodologies invented and promulgated that incorporate the above? – it can’t require one or two of a couple dozen super-pros in the world on your team to get it right, it needs to be more common and accessible. – somehow security-thinking needs to be made more efficient, so it’s easier to build in…
– somehow convert a few of the other 95% to care about security… (this is slow going, but possible)Ģ) Make adding security cheaper for them, for example: – regulations to force it (this is kind of heavy-handed though, and not likely when our governments love insecurity in everything so they can all wipe out human rights more easily) – giving them a giant PR disaster more often over it so people associate a negative image or feeling with them (it works just like a negative advertisement) – boycotting the devices (but beware, getting enough people to do it with you to make an impact is hard!) (1) Make it more expensive NOT to add security, for example: As long as this is true, NO company CAN AFFORD TO ADD SECURITY…. 99 times out of 100 there is nothing more sinister going on than that simple fact at work. Why? The reason is very simple: Adding security costs a lot of money, without a balancing gain in profit. “Can the muppets producing peripherals and cellphones take security seriously” Case in point, by reverse engineering the communication protocol, storage details and operation codes, we identified several vulnerabilities in Fitbit (abstract link in attached article) In this paper we show that while compelling, the careless integration of health data into social networks is fraught with privacy and security vulnerabilities. “The fusion of social networks and wearable sensors is becoming increasingly popular, with systems like Fitbit automating the process of reporting and sharing user fitness da ta. Finally, we demonstrate that actual user activity data is authenticated and not provided in plaintext on an end-to-end basis from the device to the Fitbit web service BTLE credentials are also exposed on the network during device pairing over TLS, which might be intercepted by MITM attacks.
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We also discovered that MAC addresses on Fitbit devices are never changed, enabling user- correlation attacks. In fact, we find evidence of per-minute activity data that is sent to the Fitbit web service but not provided to the owner. We further show that Fitbit does not pro- vide device owners with all of the data collected. We provide evidence that Fitbit unnecessarily obtains information about nearby Flex devices under certain circumstances. Finally, we study the security properties of the network traffic between the Fitbit smartphone or computer application and the Fitbit web service.
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Third, we analyze the security of the Fitbit Android app.
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Next, we observe the Bluetooth traffic sent between the Fitbit device and a smartphone or personal computer during synchronization. First, we analyze the security and privacy properties of the Fitbit device itself.
Our analysis covers four distinct attack vectors. Our objectives are to describe (1) the data Fitbit collects from its users, (2) the data Fitbit provides to its users, and (3) methods of recovering data not made available to device owners. “This report describes an analysis of the Fitbit Flex ecosystem. What I don’t understand is the company’s lack of response to earlier vulnerability reports in early 20 by researchers at two different universities and/or the company’s lack of internal controls to capably discover and mitigate possible breaches: